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This paper reveals the relationship between managerial compensation and firm risk-taking for retailers. 
Theory suggests that stock-option base payments produce incentives for managers to take on risky 
projects and adopt a risky investment policy, decreasing their risk aversion effect of delta. However, a 
change relatively to the nature of business or in the firm’s asset tangibility may affect the meaning of 
investment’s riskiness and consequently take an effect on managers’ risk-taking decisions. Over time, 
retailers have become more technological and therefore less tangible compared to traditional retailers 
that operate both online and offline. This paper extends previous literature by providing a more tractable 
understanding between the managerial incentives and risk-taking decisions across levels of asset 
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Given the recent growing usage of equity-based compensation in the form of stocks or options, the 
sensitivity of an executive’s wealth has significantly increased with this. It resulted in implications for 
the firm and its shareholders. This paper analyses the sensitivity of firm executives’ portfolios (wealth) 
to changes in the firm’s stock price (delta) and to changes in the stock return volatility (vega). By 
controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity, it is shown that a high vega is associated with riskier 
policy choices. Although theory shows that investment in research and development as well as leverage 
is seen as risky, whereas investments in capital expenditure, such as property and plant, are seen as less 
risky. Some findings in this paper show that depending on the nature of business (and respective asset 
tangibility), in retailing, some of these relationships may have a contrary significant meaning, as a result 
of a change in sense of riskiness. This is the case for digital retailers and retailers with a low asset 
tangibility ratio.  
The sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to the stock price can be seen as aligning manager incentives with 
shareholder interests. It is assumed that stockholders combine delta and vega to maximise their 
investment but control for risk. This combination can be applied dependant on the nature of the firm, to 
expose executives to more or less sensitivity and lead them in the direction of the right investment 
policy choice. Therefore, when delta increases, the executive will try harder as he will gain more and 
suffer more loss, in line with shareholders which eliminates agency costs. Increased risk exposure will 
affect the firm, and its shareholders, as well as the executives if their wealth is linked to the firm’s. 
Hence, this tends to lead to a risk averse approach by firm management. 
On the other hand, extending option-based compensation increases the executives’ wealth sensitivity to 
the stock return volatility which provides a convex payoff. The higher the stock return volatility, the 
higher the wealth. This incentivises executives to take on risky projects and adopt a risky investment 
policy, decreasing the risk aversion effect of delta.  
Following Coles et al. (2006), this paper extends their work by analysing which effect vega and delta 
have on investment as well as firm risk. The association across firm characteristics, investment policies 
and executive compensation is examined for U.S. retailers. It is found that a higher vega in digital 
retailers relates to more investment in CAPEX, less R&D expenditure and an increase on the leverage 
firm policy. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the most relevant literature to 
provide a background on executive compensation and bring retailers into context. Section 3 describes 
the development of the main hypotheses of this paper, while Section 4 describes the construction of the 
sample and outlines the empirical methods used to control for endogeneity and to isolate causation. 
Section 5 presents evidence on the relationship of investment and finance policies to delta and vega. 
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Section 6 provides additional research to the empirical findings found in previous section, by analysing 
the compensation structure in detail, as well as the relation to investment firm’s policy and benefits 
from it. This analysis is based on a comparison of U.S. retailers to UK low tangible digital retailers. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature 
Over the past two decades, managerial incentives have been subject to a long debate in the academic 
literature. The literature on agency theory supports that shareholders should link CEOs’ compensation 
and wealth to changes in firm performance. By linking their pay, it is possible to align managers’ and 
investors’ risk preferences. Therefore, undiversified risk-averse managers can be incentivised to pursue 
riskier NPV opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Guay, 1999; Core and Guay, 1999). 
The link between shareholders and top executive directors (including the CEO) can be direct or indirect, 
based on the nature of pay schemes. Pay-for-performance is identified as a direct link, such as in the 
form of stock options, restricted stock (RS) or long-term incentives awards (LTIAs). On the other hand, 
indirect incentives are made as a result of adjustments through accounting-based bonuses, sporadic 
adjustments on salary levels and option grant sizes, among others. The focus of this paper is on the 
effects of equity incentives, which have been well-discussed in academia, due to their substantial 
representation in compensation schemes of top management executives (including the CEO). Hall and 
Murphy (2002) document the exponential growth of stock offerings in executive compensation over 
time. This reaches a high of 40 percent of total compensation for the S&P 500 CEO’s in 1998. 
Therefore, it should be reviewed why and when stock options are to be used as there are several 
examples as to when this can go wrong, as Ju et al. (2014) show.  
2.1. Stock option incentives 
The literature around the effects of equity incentives for risk-taking decisions’ can be segmented into 
two major groups: (1) Researchers have given their contribution on the relationship between a firm’s 
characteristics and its compensation scheme. Results show that corporate characteristics, such as value, 
performance, profitability, board composition and legal internal corporative code, aligned with equity-
based pay take a significant impact on the firm’s strategic policy. (2) On the other hand, several papers 
contributed with evidence on the relation between compensation structure and firm performance. These 
results show that shareholders regulate the managerial risk preferences of their executives in order to 
achieve beneficial results for themselves1. 
Across researchers, Jensen and Murphy (1990) are suggested to be one of the major references in the 
current literature for this topic. They examined the agency prediction that CEOs are only incentivised 
                                                          
1 For example, Tobin’s Q and managerial performance sensitivity (through ownership) are related – see Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1999). 
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to act on the behalf of their shareholders’ and in their best interest if they are offered an incentive 
scheme, like pay-for-performance. To reach this conclusion, the authors analysed the magnitude of 
several incentive tools in the compensation scheme. It is suggested that a dollar-for-dollar measure for 
option delta is closely associated to managerial percentage ownership. Later on, Hall and Liebman 
(1998) present a contradictory argument to Jensen and Murphy’s findings. Hall and Liebman show an 
alternative method for stock option valuation based on option delta. This takes into consideration a 
dollar change in option value with respect to a one percent change in the stock price. With this, the 
authors intend to avoid high dependency on a time horizon and the exclusive focus on CEOs’ wealth 
movements relative to the company’s value, which is what Jensen and Murphy do. In addition, Hall and 
Liebmann present evidence that there was a significant increase of the pay-for-performance sensitivity2 
for 1980 to 1994. This is mainly due to an increment of 33 percentage points (from 57% to 90%) in the 
amount of options held by CEOs, during the respective time range. 
However, Smith and Stulz (1985) and May (1995) give a great contribution by introducing the two 
sided effect from an overexposure to delta by risk-averse managers on additional firm risk. In their 
analysis, the authors argue that risk-averse managers can reduce firm risk or even reject risky, positive 
net present value (NPV) projects, as excessive management stock holding (wealth tied to the firm’s 
performance) can represent a potential cost. May (1995) supports this view by showing evidence that 
managers with very large stock holdings tend to prefer risk-reducing acquisitions. 
Moreover, convexity starts to play an essential role in mitigating risk, as it provides a balance in the 
effort of choice versus volatility. Hemmer et al. (1999) underline the benefit that arises by increasing 
convexity in executive compensation when there is a relation between managerial incentives and firm 
risk. 
The option vega measures this convexity and can be obtained as the Black-Scholes partial derivative of 
option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock return volatility. By looking at the effects of CEOs’ 
wealth convexity on the stock price in detail, Guay (1999) initiates a literature debate on the causal 
relation between vega and corporate policy. He shows that the relation between vega and stock volatility 
is positive, and documents that compensation incentives take an impact on managerial decisions, which 
in turn has consequences on the firm’s risk profile. However, literature also supports that excessive 
incentives on pursuing riskier projects (with an objective on higher returns) can produce a negative 
effect on vega. This is shown by Lambert et al. (1991), who show that a convex payoff structure of 
options may not be sufficient to compensate for the exposure to such a high level of risk. 
                                                          
2 To sustain their point, they segment firms into percentiles according to their stock performance. They explain that median of total compensation for the CEO is $1 million 
if the companies’ stock has a “thirtieth percentile annual return (-7.0 percent) and is $5 million if the firm’s stock has a seventieth percentile annual return (20.5 percent)” (Hall 




Although manager ownership can resemble alignment between shareholders and managers, approaches 
by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988) show that at extremely high levels of manager 
ownership, the firm may experience an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. These findings show a negative relation between high levels of ownership and 
firm performance (referred as managerial entrenchment). This is verified in practical terms when 
managers gain so much power that they authorise themselves to use the firm in their own interest instead 
of acting in the best interest of shareholders. On the other hand, the empirical results by Himmelberg et 
al. (1999) suggest that managerial ownership is used as a tool to minimise agency costs. 
2.2. Causality in managerial incentives and risk-taking decisions 
 Causality on the vega-firm relation has been a much debated subject among researchers, mainly due to 
problems of potential underlying and omitted primitive factors when determining the relation between 
vega and equity risk. In order to control endogenous issues, and using a more refined empirical method 
with control on CEOs’ option delta, Coles et al. (2006) extend the literature by documenting the 
causality relationship between vega and corporate policies. Their findings support the view that a high 
vega (higher sensitivity to the firm’s stock price volatility) encourages risk-taking. The empirical results 
denote a significant relation between managerial incentives and the degree of risky policy 
implementations, with the following relationship: firms with higher values for vega end up with higher 
leverage, more R&D spending, lower capital expenditure and a reduction of diversification. 
A different stream of research suggests the divergent reactions for exposure to other risk-taking 
incentives. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) make the effort to expand literature in the risk-taking 
causality to other executive roles. They focus on the different managerial choices taken by CEOs vs. 
CFOs when exposed to different levels of risk-taking incentives. The results demonstrate that CFOs’ 
risk-taking incentives lead to less risky debt-maturity choices and less accruals management, while 
CEOs’ incentives are related to leverage and cash balances. However, none of these studies were 
sufficient to provide significant evidence on the potential influence of CEOs on CFOs’ accounting 
decisions. Nevertheless, along these lines, prior studies that use vega as the independent variable show 
a positive relation of vega and debt (Cohen et al, 2000) and stock return volatility (Cohen et all, 2000; 
Guay, 1999). 
By using a relatively similar monitoring governance approach, Core et al. (1999), defend that a potential 
method to identify governance problems is to compare the firm’s managerial stock ownership to the 
firm’s peers group. Therefore, researchers argue that the board should regulate ownership levels through 
target ownership plans, which can be used as a tool to mitigate actual or potential governance problems 
by requiring managers to detain a certain minimum level of ownership. This would avoid poor 
performance from low managerial ownership levels which has been evidenced. The authors also 
identify the influence of CEOs’ decisions on the board of directors as an inefficiency factor that can 
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influence shareholders. CEO compensation may not be regulated in a way that supports the 
maximization of shareholders returns. Therefore, target compensation plans should be adopted as a 
solution when the board of directors identifies governance problems, in order to move the company to 
a more appropriate governance structure. 
In addition, Hayes et al. (2012) provide evidence on how exogenous shocks from the adoption of a new 
accounting standard can have an impact on the causal relation between option-based compensation and 
risk-taking decisions. This is shown on the basis of FAS 123R in 2005, which is a revised standard that 
required the use of fair value instead of the cost-base method when measuring compensation. 
Compliance with the new regulation led firms to reduce their level of stock option offerings due to a 
change the valuation method of options as this became more costly, and therefore a less attractive 
remuneration tool for shareholders. Nonetheless, this study provides great support for the impact of 
options on convexity levels in the executive compensation scheme. 
Moreover, Ju et al. (2002) argue that corporate risk-taking can be led by call options due to the causal 
relation between managerial risk aversion and the firm’s investment policy, mainly for technological 
investment. In the effort to provide continuity, Lewellen (2003) shows results on the decrease of the 
managerial risk-taking for stock options that are in the money. Similarly, she argues that stock options 
dishearten leverage several times.   
Other researchers focus on analysing the level and structure of CEOs’ compensation scheme in the 
banking sector, and how this differs to non-bank firms. Houston and James (1995) present a positive 
relation between CEO ownership and market-to-book ratio, however, such evidence is significantly 
lower in the banking sectors. The authors believe that it can be explained by highly regulatory 
limitations imposed by the banking regulatory agencies. These impose restrictive and limitative 
regulations on the sector in order to prevent bankers from taking advantage of short-term benefits to the 
detriment of long-term sustainability. The fact that banks as financial institutions are highly regulated, 
leveraged and secured by deposit insurance mechanisms, leads researchers to conclude that regulation, 
debt ratio3 and securitization of banks takes a significant effect on the pay-for-performance of CEOs in 
the banking sector. 
Guay (1999) uses vega as the dependent variable, finding a positive relationship to firm dimension, 
investment opportunities and R&D intensity. Similarly, several researchers analyse the relation of delta 
and policy choices. Using delta as the dependent variable (Bizjak et al., 1993; Core and Guay, 1999), 
authors analyse delta being composed of firm attributes, whereas others see delta as the independent 
variable, such as Aggarwal and Samwick (2002a) who regress capital expenditure on delta. It becomes 
                                                          
3 John and Qian (2003) conducted an empirical analysis that shows evidence of the leverage effect on CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
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clear that the causality can be perceived from both sides for vega and delta, as dependant and 
independent variables.  
In general, it can be said that these parallel but independent findings of the literature suggest that it is 
critical to account for policy choices and firm characteristics jointly when determining managerial 
compensation. 
2.3. Asset tangibility 
Over the last century the retailing industry has experienced a constant evolution due to continuous 
adjustments from technology to product and service innovation which retailers were forced to take on 
to stay competitive. In 2014, the retailing industry represented two thirds of the U.S. GDP and 
worldwide recorded total sales of $22 trillion (Farfan, 2015). Considering this development, this paper 
links the evolution of executive compensation with managerial risk preferences in the retail industry.  
The retail sector is influenced by several trends and forces, globally and locally. Regulation has a 
significant influence on retail, now more than ever, especially the adoption of international accounting 
standards. The revision of FAS 123, which introduced accounting for stock-based compensation, caused 
a change in how firms compensated their employees as the standard complicated accounting rules. 
Economic impacts as well as social or demographic changes effect customers’ behaviour fundamentally 
and therefore, retailers. One of the reason for these shifts is an increased usage of technology which 
makes retail more accessible and transparent for customers. Technology has a much stronger influence 
than offline advertising or shopping. This leads more traditional retailers to higher investments on 
research and development to be the first of technological innovations. At the same time, this means that 
retailers are reducing their asset tangibility as the need for digitalisation increases, being forced to adjust 
operations in the new face of technology. It is a vicious circle of customers changing behaviour and 
consumption habits simultaneously with retailers going offline and digitalising4.  
Following the main purpose of this paper, a general review on asset tangibility is relevant in order to 
assist in understanding the implications and effects that tangibility can have on retailers’ performance 
and risk-taking decisions made by their management team.  
Nowadays, the retail sector faces a variety of external and internal challenges that continue to test the 
ability of retailing firms to create future value. This can be indicated by how widely spread out 
performance across the retail sector is. The different levels of performance are due to divergent 
utilisation of tangible assets. These are used in more, or less, effective and efficient ways. To illustrate 
this, retail asset hierarchy can be looked at Figure 1 which shows the asset hierarchy model developed 
by Williams and Acito (2007). 
                                                          




Figure 1: Retail asset hierarchy 
The asset hierarchy model is a conceptual model presented by Williams and Acito (2007) to recognise the value of (in)tangible 
assets based on each hierarchic level in the context of retailing. 
 
Tangible assets are shown at the most basic level, forming the foundation of all operations for any 
retailer. At the bottom level, the store (layouts, location, equipment, etc.), financial assets and inventory 
can be found. There are the less tangible assets at the middle level. These include information system, 
software for an accurate and efficient pricing and merchandising strategy as well as all the remaining 
mechanisms to support a strong relationship with all respective stakeholders (suppliers, customers, etc.). 
At the top of the pyramid, the most intangible assets are found. These are inherent in visionary 
leadership, the innovation procurement and in the differentiation of the firm functional areas. 
At last, asset tangibility is also a major determinant of the firm’s ability to finance its investments 
externally (Almeida and Campello, 2007). The asset tangibility ratio shows to be an interesting metric 
of analysis, in order to examine how the causality between managerial incentives and risk-taking policy 
differs across retailers for different levels of asset tangibility. Moreover, it is important to study how 
these results can be associated with the business operations of the firm. No relevant literature that 
describes the effect of asset tangibility on executive compensation incentives can be found which makes 
this paper one of the first to examine the relationship.  
3. Hypotheses development 
This study extends the existing literature on causal relationship between managerial compensation and 
investment and financial policy. It shows a more tractable look into the retail industry and how pre-
determined asset tangibility takes a major impact on either firm policy or managerial incentives in order 
to promote continuous development on a more effective and satisfying response to shareholders’ needs. 
As argued in the literature, the implementation of “value-maximizing investment and financial policy” 
involves mutual causality between shareholders’ regulation of vega, along with delta, and pre-
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determined firm characteristics (Coles et al. 2006). This can be in the form of general and firm-specific 
human capital, production technology, asset tangibility, growth opportunities, industry and 
segmentation and ability to preserve firm’s intellectual property (meaning service, operation or 
product). 
Considering digitalisation as a major source of innovation, retailers have made constant adjustments 
responding to changes in the consumption habits of shoppers over the last decade. As a result, riskier 
investments were made, mainly because of a superior investment in R&D as a guarantee of a more 
reliable and reactive response to market needs. Due to the nature of retailing, a consistent observation 
is made that more digital and online present retailers have a generally lower asset tangibility, compared 
to more traditional and offline retailers, which record the highest level of tangibility. The latter include 
for example stores and restaurants. As a result, retailers were split in three main layers based on a match 
between their asset tangibility ratio and the level of digitalisation of their operations as Table 1 shows. 
 
Table 1: Classification of U.S. retailers by level of asset tangibility 
The split of a total of 2,747 U.S. retailers listed on the Compustat Execucomp Database, for 1992 to 2011, with SIC codes 
ranging from 5200 to 5990. Low asset tangibility is classed as a tangibility ratio up to 24 percent. Medium groups the retailers 
with a ratio between 24 and 53 percent, whereas a high asset tangibility stands for ratios above 53 percent. 
As a consequence of digitalisation, shareholders and the management team faced new challenges as the 
asset structure of firms changed. Statistics show an increased investment in R&D which resulted in 
retailers becoming less tangible due to a more growing and present technological component in the asset 
structure of the firms (Hagberg et al., 2004). 
To address this change in the core business of retailing firms, shareholders play a key role in the 
regulation of optimal levels of compensation, and in particular of stock options, which are broadly 
considered as the main drivers of convexity in compensation plans. Convexity is affecting managers 
daily as it gives the right incentives to maintain firm risk when deciding on financial and investment 
policies.  Thus, by offering options to managers, shareholders try to mitigate the wealth-firm risk agency 
problem, incentivising management to pursue positive, but risky, NPV projects. In other words, 
“convexity in compensation makes risk more valuable to managers, higher vega should implement 
riskier investment and financial policies and higher return volatility” (Coles et al., 2004, p. 8). However, 
this fact gains even more relevance if we consider that opposing to shareholders, managers are risk-
averse undiversified individuals, who have the possibility of changing firm risk with their investment 
policy choices. It is empirically shown that management teams might be willing to forgo positive NPV 
projects as the costs to increase firm risk seems higher than the potential benefits arising from firm 
value.  As Amihud and Lev (1981) state, risk-averse managers are likely to pursue less than optimal 
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firm risk. This is to the objective of protecting their own firm-specific human capital which does not 
have any value other than in the company the manager is currently at. 
In terms of investment policy, an increase in vega can produce a stronger incentives for a CEO to invest 
the firm’s capital in riskier assets. For instance, R&D expenditure is normally seen as a risky investment 
compared to CAPEX as it is more intangible (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Kothari et al., 2001). This is 
mainly driven by moving investment away from tangible assets, such as PPE (property, plant and 
equipment). Finally the financial policy is affected by a change in vega, in the sense that higher vega 
will incentivise managers to increase the firm’s leverage, and therefore increases the overall risk of the 
firm. 
Consequently, it seems relevant to understand the impact of managerial incentives and suitable firm 
characteristics in the strategic policy of retailing firms across the different levels of asset tangibility. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
Hypothesis A: An increase on vega should lead to more investment in R&D expenditure, lower 
investment in CAPEX and increase total leverage. 
To support the empirical analysis, the effects of delta are tested too. This is based on the empirical 
evidence shown across existing literature and in particular on policy choices and firm risk-taking 
decisions. However, as stated by John and John (1993) there are no clear conclusions with regards to 
the sign of the effect that a higher delta can have on a change in risk to debtholders. Complementary to 
this, Guay (1999) argues that an increase in option delta can lead to an overexposure of managers to 
even more risk, causing managers to opt for less risky projects. Hence, a second hypothesis is 
formulated: 
Hypothesis B: An increase on delta should decrease R&D expenditure, leverage and increase CAPEX. 
4. Sample collection and construction of variables 
The data sample consists of all U.S. firms listed on the Compustat Execucomp Database and the 
Compustat annual industrial files for 1992 to 2011, inclusive. The total compensation for the top 
management executives are obtained from Execucomp. This includes salary, bonus, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long term incentive 
awards (LTIAs), and total cash compensation (TCC). The top management executives are annually 
ranked by TCC which is made up of salary and bonus. As this study focuses on retailers, only these are 




Table 2: Summary statistics of firm characteristics for all U.S. retailers 
The data includes the firm specific characteristics of 2,747 US retailers listed on the Compustat annual industrial Database, 
for 1992 to 2011, with SIC codes ranging from 5200 to 5990. The details about the formulation of each variable is presented 
in Table 21 and 22 (appendix).  
Table 2 shows firm-specific data obtained from the Fundamentals Annual tab of Compustat. After data 
requirements, the observations differ between 12,573, for R&D, and a maximum of 16,213, for Sales. 
It was not possible to obtain the required information for all retailers which is why the number of 
observations varies for the analysed policy measure. Firms that have no investment in R&D, capital 
expenditure and leverage are eliminated.  
To support the hypotheses of this paper, a comparison between retailers to firms of other industries is 
drawn in section five. Excluded are financial institutions and utilities as these can lead biased results. 
The information for these firms is obtained from Compustat Execucomp Database. Similarly, number 
of observations varies as information is not provided for all firms.  
As a measure of management incentives, delta is defined as the ‘change in the dollar value of the 
executive’s wealth for a one percentage point change in the stock price’ (Coles et al., 2006, p. 439). 
Vega is the ‘change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized 
standard deviation of the stock returns’ (Coles et al., 2006, p. 439). Both metrics were computed and 
provided by Dr. Novotny-Farkas, Lancaster University Management School. 
4.1. Summary statistics of compensation 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the full period 1992 to 2011 on annual compensation variables 
of the top management executives and CEOs. There are 2,747 CEOs and 13,472 management 
executives. The CEO is separated from other executives for these statistics to obtain more observations. 
The variables are categorised under CEO characteristics, firm characteristics and investment and 
financial policies. The total annual compensation across the top management executives sums up to 
$1,602.73 thousand on average. On the other hand, the average CEO earns $4,740.93 thousand dollars 
as total compensation. His salary, bonus and options are higher than for management executives, 
whereas the latter have more LTIAs and RS. Salary is the largest component of the remuneration plan 





Table 3: Summary statistics for compensation (all firms) 
Summary statistics on the compensation structure and the firms and their respective policy measures for overall sample, for 
the full period 1992 to 2011. Annual compensation variables are split by top management team and CEO position. The details 
about the formulation of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
Table 4 presents summary statistics on compensation for firms at different asset tangibility levels. The 
firms are divided into high, medium and low tangibility to compare whether there is a difference in 
compensation for executives and different tangibility levels. It can be underlined that retailers with a 
more hybrid operational activity, i.e. digital and traditional which is seen as operating as a medium asset 
tangibility firm, offer the highest compensation package. It is five percent above the overall average. 
Salary seems to be highest in medium tangible firms, whereas RS, LTIAs and bonuses are lowest.  
Therefore, these are highest in highly tangible firms which offer a lower salary. This applies for CEOs 





Table 4: Summary statistics for compensation (split according to asset tangibility) 
Summary statistics on the compensation structure and the firms and their respective policy measures across three distinct 
asset tangibility layers, for 1992 to 2011. Annual compensation variables are split by top management team and CEO position. 
The details about the formulation of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of each component of the compensation plan. This includes salary, bonus, 
stock options, RS and LTIAs. It can be seen that salaries decreased substantially over time, both in 
dollar terms and as a percentage of compensation, and was consequently substituted by other pay 
components. This might be an indication of the development of aligning incentives between the 
management team (including the CEO) and shareholders. However, a temporary rebound is recorded 
between 2006 and 2008, due to a reduction in the number of options offered as part of top executive 
remuneration. Following this transition momentum, salary is partly replaced by a higher fraction of pay 
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coming from options, RS and LTIAs, as these increased after the adoption of FAS 123R. Moreover, 
vega (delta) tend to be superior (inferior) in firms with higher asset tangibility. Overall, the mean 
(median) vega is 105.39 (33.23). The mean (median) delta is 1,115.85 (235.67). For both vega and 
delta, the mean is significantly higher than the median which means that the data is positively skewed 
as a large amount is on the left side. Moreover, the mean is sensitive to extreme values but no outliers 
were excluded to not diminish the sample size. 
 
Figure 2: Development of compensation structure 1992-2011 
The chart shows the development of each pay components and their weight on the overall compensation structure, for all 
executive directors of the total of 2,747 U.S. retailers considered in the sample data. The details about the formulation of 
each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
It can be underlined that salary continues to represent the main form of pay component. Looking at 
CEOs’ remuneration across overall retailers, salary and stock options weight the most of the total 
compensation plan, with 41.80 percent and 28.20 percent, respectively. In accordance to the average in 
retailing, high tangible firms prefer salary as compensation form as it sums up to 41.60 percent. While 
and still analysing the same layer of tangibility, options, RS and LTIAs show a fairly equal weight in 
the executive compensation of CEOs with 7.30 to 8.20 percent. Over time, median vega has decreased 
for CEOs in retailing for 2000 to 2008. It decreased by 26 percentage points on average from $3,340.22 
to $634.86 as for a 0.01 change in stock return volatility. A significant drop can be noticed during 2006 
and 2007. This is the period during which a majority of U.S. firms start to comply with the new 
accounting standard FAS 123R. A lower median vega for low tangible firms is related to an inferior 
monetary remuneration due to more volatile results, such as cash flows, recorded by highly digital 
retailers. Considering that options are the major component in compensation that increases convexity, 
measured by vega, the literature shows that in general, vega decreases with the reduction of option 
usage.   
4.2. Firm characteristics  
The policy measures considered for investment and financial purposes are: (1) R&D, treated as research 
and development expenditure; (2) CAPEX, seen as net capital expenditure (capital expenditure less 
sales of PPE); (3) Book Leverage, defined as total book value of long-term debt, including the current 
portion, deflated by total book value of assets, (4) ROA, defined as EBITDA divided by total book 
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value of assets (5) Market-to-Book, defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total 
liabilities deflated by total assets, (6) Sales, treated as logarithm of sales to proxy for firm size, and 
Asset Tangibility, defined as the book value of PPE deflated by book value of total assets. 
In addition, and consistent with the existing literature, total cash compensation (salary plus bonus) is 
considered as a proxy of risk aversion of the top executive management team. However, a paradox in 
existing literature can be found where two opposite perspectives are plausible. Berger et al. (1997) 
explains that longer tenure and higher cash compensation are associated to CEOs with superior level of 
both embeddedness and risk aversion. Contrary to that, Guay (1999) states that CEOs with greater total 
cash compensation rather invest outside the firm towards optimal portfolio levels to achieve a better 
diversification. The higher the cash compensation, the more likely their diversification which 
consequently leads to less risk aversion in their decision making process as they themselves are 
diversified and will not suffer much if the firm values decreases, hence, they take on additional risk. 
4.3. Summary statistics of firm characteristics 
The lower part of Table 3 and 4 provides summary statistics of the firm characteristics, including a 
deeper analysis of the sample by splitting it based on the firms’ tangibility levels. Results are in line 
with related studies about asset tangibility and capital structure. The literature implies that tangibility 
matters as it allows creditors to more easily repossess assets of a firm that goes bankrupt. Therefore, it 
increases potential borrowing capacity. Consistently, from the view of credit supply of capital structure, 
the data shows that the tangibility level of a firm is an important driver of leverage (financing policy) 
and CAPEX (investment policy). Just like tangibility helps a firm to raise new debt, redeployability of 
assets has the same function. The more different tasks an asset can fulfil, the more popular and the more 
liquid it is (Campello and Giambona, 2013). 
In contrast, low tangible firms show to concentrate their focus on R&D when it comes to investment 
decisions. A plausible explanation is related to the fact that low tangible retailers operate in a more 
digital environment, in which firms have superior needs for regular updates on their source of 
innovation in order to stay competitive in the market. Retailers today have a new sense of urgency when 
it comes to harnessing technology, and it is not just about having a great complementary website or 
online store. Therefore, more digital and less tangible firms tend to compete in an accelerated pace, 
with digital innovation dictating the success or failure at the end of the day. A stronger focus on R&D 
is justified as a source of innovation for retailers to solidify links with customers. With regards to 
remaining policy variables, obtained results in this paper are similar to values reported in related studies, 
such as Barclay et al. (2003) and Queiroga (2014). 
Overall, there is sufficient evidence to underline that asset tangibility has an influence on the structure 
of compensation contracts. This might indicate that firms adjust their corporate policies in order to 
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promote growth with limited risk exposure. Additionally, the CEO is not the only one who suffers from 
the impact of these changes. The top management executives are undergoing a change of their 
compensation as well. Moreover, regarding firm characteristics it appears that no major changes 
occurred due to changes in asset tangibility. Firms with lower tangibility invest mainly in R&D to 
promote more efficiency towards digital retailing while more tangible retailers opt to invest the double 
in PPE in comparison to other layers of tangibility. 
5. Regression analysis 
The hypotheses developed in section 3 are taken into consideration on the following empirical tests, 
presented in the following sub sections. To explain the causality between management incentives and 
the firm policy based on asset tangibility for the U.S. retail sector, I apply a random-effects model on 
regressions performed. This is the best choice of regression due to the lack of need for any in-time 
control of heterogeneity across firms and respective variables. This empirical method deviates from 
Coles et al. (2006), who applies a fixed effect regression approach for the empirical analysis. Moreover, 
the use of control variables in my regression analysis intends to identify their explanatory meaning on 
the dependent variable and to check whether the effect of these control variables is in fact significant. 
Thus, by holding a set of variables constant, I isolate the effect of asset tangibility in three distinct levels 
(low, medium and high) in an attempt to attribute meaningful results to my study. 
5.1. Investment policy and managerial risk-taking incentives 
This section describes how risk-taking forms incentives for CEOs and top executives managers to 
implement a riskier investment policy. Literature argues that firms that have a higher vega, will have 
more debt, spend more on R&D, but less on CAPEX and are inclined to be less diversified. Therefore, 
due to the dynamic development in the retail sector, I analyse the effects of managerial risk-taking 
incentives set by shareholders on retailers’ investment policy. Comparable results are based on (1) their 
asset tangibility ratio (low, medium or high), (2) the technological development of their core operations 
(digital versus non-digital retailers). 
At last, all the regressions performed follow the assumption that investment policy and the structure of 
compensation are jointly set up and not at different points in time. Therefore, contemporaneous values 
of vega and delta are used in the regressions presented in the following sub sections, rather than lagged 
variables. 
5.1.1. CAPEX and managerial incentives 
While controlling for vega and delta as the primary explanatory variables, this and subsequent sections 
will include several firm specific explanatory variables, classified accordingly to the following 
categories: valuation, solvency, operating efficiency, operating profitability, financial risk and price 
behaviour. It is underlined that these variables are selected in the intention to maximise the explanatory 
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power of the model without losing consistency to relative literature on this subject, as the model follows 
Coles et al. (2006), Guay (1999), Servaes (1994), Bhagat and Welch (1995), and Opler et al. (1999), 
among others. 
The component cash compensation is included as an explanatory variable due to significant weight on 
top executives’ remuneration plan, especially in retailing (accounting an average of 55.9 percent). 
Besides the fact that pay-in-cash is a standard practice, total cash compensation, as salary and bonus, 
represents an excellent managerial motivation to accomplish high goals in the short-term. Consistent 
with literature the sign of the relation between investment policy and cash compensation is positive, 
which is compatible with the view that cash compensation is still built around profit targets and 
therefore, meeting these targets can lead to lucrative bonuses. 
Operating income before depreciation (OIBD) is commonly referred to as operating profit. This 
component will provide the right enforcement to the explanatory power of the regressions that are 
performed. Higher probability may be associated with the adoption of suitable incentive compensation 
plans, such as stock options plans, which consequently increases vega values. It is also plausible to 
support the view that a stronger operating income favours business growth and therefore higher 
investment policy. Drivers of firm performance and financial health are gathered from the intersection 
of several papers written on the topic and are combined in order to achieve better empirical results. The 
considered variables are the following: surplus cash, Return on Assets (ROA), market-to-book and cash. 
Due to a secondary focus on asset tangibility as a condition to the optimal compensation scheme, overall 
tangibility and book leverage were included as well. Directly related to each other, they will provide 
the main basis of analysis and explanatory meaning to this study. The empirical regression is formally 
stated as follows: 
CAPEX = α + β1 ∗ delta + β2 ∗ vega + β3 ∗ cash compensation + β4 ∗ OIBD + β5 ∗ surplus cash + β6
∗ ROA + β7 ∗ market − to − book + β8 ∗ book leverage + β9 ∗ overall tangibility 
Table 5 shows regression results for CAPEX given for CEO and the top management executives, 
respectively. As a result of similar outcomes from both panel A and B, the following empirical 




Table 5: Regression on CAPEX 
The table shows the regression results for CAPEX as a dependant variable, given for CEO and the top management executives. The statistics are shown for all industries, the whole retailing sector 
and for retailers split across the three distinct asset tangibility layers. The period covers 1992 to 2011. The all industry column is included as benchmark for the entire market system, in which I 
excluded financial institutions and utilities. The details about the formulation of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix).
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The sign behind the independent variables indicates which relationship has been supported by the 
literature for vega, delta and cash compensation. In the left column, coefficient results are shown for 
firms from all industries, except financial institutions and utilities, to provide a comparison between 
retailers and non-retailing firms. In accordance to existing literature, the coefficient of vega is negative 
and statistically significant for the sample of all retailers. This implies that riskier incentives are 
associated to lower capital expenditure, such as investments in property, industrial buildings or 
equipment to increase the scope of their operations. However, this relationship could also be a result of 
either a transitory change in the scope of the business (for instance, to upgrade the firm’s physical 
assets) that harmed the ability to track perfectly normal levels of managerial incentives or even a short-
term decision taken by the board of directors to alter the investment policy, with negative constraints 
on top executives’ incentives. Analytically, an increase of one standard deviation in vega translates into 
a decrease of five percent in investment in CAPEX (from the mean CAPEX of $4,842 to $4,588 
thousand). 
Cash compensation and OIBD show a positive influence on CAPEX, at statistical significance of one 
percent. Both variables have a positive link to firm performance. Therefore, an increment in CAPEX as 
a result of such increase on either one of these control variables could represent a permanent or 
temporary superior investment on expanding the scale of business and hence, will improve operating 
results. 
Tangibility appears to have a positive effect and is significant at one percent for the all industries. 
However, it seems to have a lower explanatory power when this is reduced to only retailers. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to verify the decreasing effect of stock-based incentives when retailers 
become less tangible. This fact supports the proposition that the more tangible the retail operational 
service is, the higher the riskier incentives on investing on complementary business service, such as 
digital retailing. 
As previously mentioned, the ongoing changes due to digitalisation in retailing have resulted in several 
new opportunities for businesses (Quelch & Klein, 1996), new firms (Mols, 2000), business and firm 
models (Sorescu et al., 2011) and forms of trading and selling (Gloor, 2000). Therefore, I perform a 
second regression in order to further understand the differences between managerial incentives and 
investment policy on digital retailers. The corresponding results are shown in Table 6. It distinguishes 
between digital and non-digital retailers which shows the contradictory effects by retailers who are 




Table 6: Regression on CAPEX (split according to digital and non-digital) 
The table shows the regression results for CAPEX given for the top management executives (including CEO), with division 
according to digital versus non-digital retailers. Time range is from 1992 to 2011. The details about the formulation of each 
variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
The convexity of the top managerial team with CAPEX is positive at a significance of one percent. This 
effect supports the prediction that CAPEX is treated as a risky investment for already digital retailers. 
The only way for these to further grow the business is to take on additional risk by expanding with 
CAPEX. This is contradicting literature. An example for this is Amazon, a low tangible digital retailer, 
which invested in three new distribution centres in Poland to expand its logistics capacity and solidify 
growth in Eastern Europe in 2013 (Bryan, 2013). 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient tests presented in Table 14 (appendix) do not show much correlation 
between the variables. It indicates how an independent and a dependent variable are associated. 
Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates the dependent variable moves in the opposite direction when 
the independent variable moves. A coefficient of zero indicates that there is no correlation between the 
variables at all. A coefficient of one indicates that the variables are perfectly related.  
5.1.2. R&D and managerial incentives 
An OLS estimation is carried out. R&D forms the dependent variable that will serve as a proxy for a 
better understanding about how stop-based incentives can have an effect on investments in innovation 
in the retail sector. Following the same approach, I perform several analyses with the intention to 
provide empirical evidence on this topic from the perspective of retailers as a whole, across asset 
tangibility and finally between digital retailers and non-digital retailers. Following the same approach 
as taken in the last section, similar independent variables expressed in the previous analysis were kept 
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in order to have mostly comparable results within the investment policy section. One additional variable 
is included with short-term investments. This being said, the regression is empirically expressed as: 
R&D = α + β1 ∗ delta + β2 ∗ vega + β3 ∗ cash compensation + β4 ∗ OIBD + β5 ∗ surplus cash + β6 ∗ ROA
+ β7 ∗ cash and ST investments + β8 ∗ market − to − book + β9 ∗ book leverage + β10
∗ overall tangibility 
Table 7 presents the regression results for both the CEO (Panel A) and top management executives 
(Panel B) on R&D. Contradicting the literature, vega presents a negative relation with investment in 
R&D at ten percent significance. In contrast to all U.S. listed firms, retailing firms (and in particular 
low tangible firms) reduce their investment in R&D by $22.4 when they experience a raise in CEO 
convexity by one percent. The contradiction, that retailers move in an opposite direction to all other 
industries, might be explained by attempting to generate future growth by moving a partial investment 
from innovation to working capital investments, and/or capital expenditure, and therefore substituting 
the investment focus found in section 5.1.1.  
Even though there is a slight lack of significance across all asset tangibility levels, the obtained evidence 
should lead to an extended discussion, with the intention to conclude further empirical tests in the future. 
Other investment alternatives (such as M&A and working capital) should be included to obtain more 
tractable conclusions on the effects of managerial stock-based incentives. Moreover, with the exception 
of ROA, all the remaining control variables seem to present the expected coefficient sign. The positive 
coefficient from ROA can be explained by low tangible retailers. Their cash flows are more dependable 
on innovation and intangible assets, supporting the foundation that positive returns generated from 
assets in place can incentivise an increment in R&D in order to achieve competitive advantage and 
support further growth. Apart from that, Table 15 (appendix) shows with the Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient that there is no major correlation among variables of the regressions. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that the observed results are consistent with results for the risk-taking 
incentives from CEOs on R&D. The top management team of medium and highly tangible retailers 
have a positive, but not significant, convexity with R&D. Although strong not statistically, this provides 
further support on the view that R&D can be taken as a riskier investment when the management team 
is incentivised to go beyond market expectations. Market-to-book also has a contradictory meaning for 
the risk incentives of the top management team, which supports the assumption that overvalued retailed 
invest more on R&D. The remaining control variables present the expected signs and are predominantly 
significant. Correlation tests for the regression are expressed in Table 15 (appendix). It presents lower 




Table 7: Regression on R&D 
The table shows the regression results for R&D as a dependant variable, given for CEO and the top management executives. The statistics are shown for all industries, the whole retailing sector 
and for retailers split across the three distinct asset tangibility layers. The period covers 1992 to 2011. The all industry column is included as benchmark for the entire market system, in which I 
excluded financial institutions and utilities. The details about the formulation of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix).
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R&D expenditure has been increasingly presented in retailers’ financial statements. For instance, the 
integration of the internet in all forms of retailing and the impact of digitalization goes far beyond the 
phenomena of e-commerce. With this in mind, Table 8 shows a split in the obtained results from digital 
versus non-digital retailers. 
 
Table 8: Regression on R&D (split according to digital and non-digital) 
The table shows the regression results for R&D given for the top management executives (including CEO), with division 
according to digital versus non-digital retailers. Time range is from 1992 to 2011. The details about the formulation of each 
variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
Even though there is a lack of significance for non-digital firms, the digitalised retailers show an inverse 
investment policy in comparison to the policy that Coles et al. (2006) argue. It is therefore aligned to 
the evidence demonstrated for low tangible retailers. These results were primarily explained due to the 
opposite behaviour by digital retailers. Looking at the results, the top executive team shows a negative 
convexity when it comes to an investment commitment in R&D. In other words, too much innovation 
can cloud the effect of profitable results due to a mismatch between what retail is offering and what the 
customer really needs in that exact moment – or clients/customers are simply not ready to recognise the 
value of an increment in innovation supplied by digitalized retailers. Therefore, this culminates in a 
mismatch between the state of technology and consumer preferences. Bearing this in mind, the top 
management team shows a movement of investment preferences away from R&D, to potentially 
allocate it to capital expenditure or alternatively any other form of investment (such as, through merger 
and acquisition or working capital) that is not empirically represented in this analysis. 
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5.2. Financial policy and managerial risk-taking incentives 
In this section, I address the relationship between risk-taking incentives and the financial policy in the 
retailing sector. By looking at the marginal effects of options, literature sets expectations on a positive 
relation between vega and leverage, implying that an increment on leverage will increase firm risk. In 
addition, shareholders set both capital structure and compensation contracts to discipline managers, 
where debt is important in aligning shareholders and managers interests (Garvey, 1997). Hence, a 
negative relation between delta and book leverage is expected for the overall retail industry. 
To keep consistency with the previous analysis, I again assume that financial policy and compensation 
scheme are jointly determined. This implies the inclusion of current values of vega and delta in the 
following empirical tests instead of lagged variables. The regression is run as follows.  
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜
− 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸(𝑛𝑒𝑡)
+ 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
The financial policy is measured as book leverage as market leverage can be volatile. The regression 
results obtained in Table 9 show the effects from managerial incentives on the financial policy. These 
are contradictory to the existing literature. Looking at incentives to riskier policy adoption, convexity 
of CEOs and top management executives has a negative relationship with book leverage. Vega presents 
a contradictory coefficient and is significant, across three of the four specifications for retailing firms 
(overall retail sector, low and highly tangible retailers). This supports literature which defends the 
opinion that firms with high earnings volatility, have shareholders that normally reduce risk-incentives 
to constrain managers on their preference for riskier projects. Consequently, the firms should be better 
off in terms of risk of financial distress (John and John, 1993). In addition, Coles et al. (2006) also 
explain that firms with more growth opportunities have lower debt in their capital structure. However, 
firms’ CEOs, with a higher vega, are incentivised to undertake on riskier projects (Guay, 1999). This 
evidence supports once again that leverage and vega should be negatively related, contradicting what is 
shown by Coles et al. (2006). Although vega’s coefficient presents statistical significance, economically 
the effect from a change in vega would have a minor impact on medium and high tangible retailers. 
Complementary to the vega analysis, the results also show a contradictory relationship between delta 
and book value of debt, only for low tangible retailers. The obtained coefficients for delta are generally 
similar to those estimated in similar empirical studies where Coles et al. (2006) argue that leverage and 
delta are substitute incentives for the firm’s financial policy, whereas higher delta implies lower 
leverage. However, for retailers with low asset tangibility, delta shows a positive coefficient at five 
percent significance. A plausible interpretation for this could be derived from the fact that firms with 
high growth results (such as, young retailers with volatile results) could possibly miss their optimal 





Table 9: Regression on book leverage 
The table shows the regression results for book leverage as a dependant variable, given for CEO and the top management executives. The statistics are shown for all industries, the whole retailing 
sector and for retailers split across the three distinct asset tangibility layers. The period covers 1992 to 2011. The all industry column is included as benchmark for the entire market system, in 
which I excluded financial institutions and utilities. The details about the formulation of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
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Additionally, existing literature still lacks on issues associated to the endogeneity between leverage and 
tangibility. Managers’ decisions on when opting for leverage in their financial decisions are not clearly 
explained. An example can be related to credit risk concerns, or any other factor from outside the firm 
that may affect access to debt. 
Table 10 shows the regression results of book leverage split into digital and non-digital firms. Delta is 
insignificant at ten percent for both columns, therefore, no conclusion can be drawn. Vega is statistically 
significant at one percent for non-digital retailers, however, with a coefficient of -0.0000664, the 
economic significance is not very high. Again, cash compensation is not statistically significant for 
either digital or non-digital firms. Even though the R-squared, which describes how much of a 
movement in book leverage can be explained by the independent variables, is at 60.3 percent for digital 
firms, it could be that the number of observations is not large enough to raise the statistical significance 
of the coefficients. The coefficient of firm size is statistically significant for both digital and non-digital 
retailers which supports that dependant on the size of firm, a different finance policy will be chosen and 
therefore, most likely a different compensation structure.    
 
Table 10: Regression on book leverage (split according to digital and non-digital) 
The table shows the regression results for book leverage given for the top management executives (including CEO), with 
division according to digital versus non-digital retailers. Time range is from 1992 to 2011. The details about the formulation 
of each variable is presented in Table 21 and 22 (appendix). 
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Again, the Spearman’s correlation coefficient test was conducted. The results are shown in Table 16 
(appendix). It shows no high correlation between variables. 
6. Small sample 
This section provides a closer look at the compensation structure offered by digital retailers to their 
executive directors, including CEOs. In doing this, a further understanding of the several relationships 
between managerial incentives and risk-taking decisions can be developed. Therefore, I suggest that 
this section should be analysed in conjunction with section 5, in order to fully understand the overall 
picture across different analyses. 
6.1. Objectives and sample description 
Based on the general results of the large sample analysis that digital retailers show a contradictory 
relationship between vega and respective investment policies, this section has been developed. 
According to results, vega has a positive influence on CAPEX and a negative influence on R&D. 
Considering the importance of such findings, it seems logical to try and understand if any changes 
occurred in the compensation structure and how remuneration differs between digital retailers in the 
U.S. and the UK. In this analysis, the state of paid remuneration and the amount of payment is looked 
at. As currencies differ between the firms, all monetary values are converted into USD. This is done to 
the exchange rate of the date of the reported value. Exchange rates are obtained from Yahoo Finance as 
shown in Table 17 (appendix). 
There are six sample firms, three are British and three chosen to be from the U.S. All company 
information is extracted from the firms’ annual reports for each analysed year and referenced in Table 
18 (appendix). Due to this, it is difficult to calculate share-based remuneration as some firms do not 
disclose this in such detailed way. Therefore, the payment components in this section are limited to 
salary, bonus, equity awards and other awards, which includes defined contribution plans such as 
pension. The analysis is done for each of the sample firms for a period of five years, which is 2010 until 
2014, inclusive, in order to provide a more practical explanation of developments in the two countries, 
based on possible structural similarities, differences and common trends.  
Table 11 indicates the list of firms treated as peer group with fairly similar characteristics and interests. 
In comparing ‘apples to apples’, it will benefit this study as constituents of a peer group should be fairly 
similar between each other. .It enables me to achieve a more accurate analysis of the values found in 
each subsection. The selection criteria for the firms are as follows: SIC code, asset tangibility, size5 and 
country. 
                                                          




Table 11: Sample firms 
Peer groups selected from Fundamentals Annual tab of Compustat Database, for 2010 to 2014. The presented tangibility is 
defined as the five year median of the firm’s asset tangibility, treated as the book value of PPE deflated by book value of total 
assets. Size shows the book value of total assets in $ million. 
At last, and by determining the practical implications of this matter, I set out what I perceive to be the 
challenges for digital retailers for the next five years as far as executive remuneration is concerned. 
6.2. Compensation schemes of U.S. and UK digital retailers 
In the digital retailing segment, firms’ executive compensation scheme has changed immensely over 
the last five years. According to PwC (2012), firms in the retail sector had to face some challenges. 
Issues produced by price deflation versus rising costs is one of the main factor. Greater sourcing from 
overseas, improved technology and the growth of discount stores stand again rising levels of cost 
inflation which resulted in squeezed profits. Additionally, a lack of consumer confidence has become 
visible. Consumers are pressured by inflation with simultaneous decreasing salaries and rising concerns 
of losing jobs as a consequence of further cuts of public spending in 2012. This has serious impacts on 
how digital firms positioned themselves in the market. Firms were forced to continuously readjust 
managerial incentives and strategic policies in order to support growth and competitiveness in the more 
digitalised retailing industry.  
An indication of this can be observed by looking at the total compensation levels from top executive 
directors, which are CEO and top management team. This is displayed in Figure 3. It shows that these 
differences among the selected firms across the two countries have increased considerably since 2011, 
which was the year when retailers were hit hard by the economic downturn. As a reaction to this, the 
three UK digital firms introduced equity awards into their compensation package. Options and LTIAs 
were added as an important motivator of performance and alignment of interests among the 
management team and respective firms. 
 
Figure 3: Total Executive Compensation U.S. and UK 
The chart shows the development of total executive compensation package across the two geographies (the US versus the 
UK). Presented figures were previously converted to USD for comparison purposes. 
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All remuneration committees’ policies of digital retailers focus on setting remuneration at an 
‘appropriate level’ to retain and motivate highly executive capital management of the appropriate 
calibre to deliver long-term economic value. The composition of remuneration plans is very distinct 
across the U.S. and the UK. To illustrate the main trends for top executives of U.S. digital retailers, 
Table 12 provides an overview of the compensation structure broken down into salary, bonus, equity 
awards and other benefits. Looking at U.S. firms, it becomes clear that cash compensation (salary plus 
bonus) is the dominant pay component, composed by an overall amount of $478,211.59 on average 
(which consists of an average salary of $351,290.44 and an average bonus of $126,921.15) for 2010 to 
2014. Although cash compensation can be treated as a short-term incentive as the executive can take it 
and walk away from the firm, U.S. retailers, in particular Systemax Inc., have protected themselves 
from selfish managerial interest by top executives. They included a non-equity pay component (or also 
named as cash bonus pool), as a pay-for-performance program, into the compensation package which 
target is split by 80 percent financial and 20 percent non-financial goals, in order to align executives’ 
decisions over corporate performance with the best interests of the firm’s shareholders. 
 
Table 12: Executive directors' compensation (2010-2014) 
Conglomeration of the remuneration plan from firms operating in the same country. All reported numbers were taken from 
firms’ proxy statements (U.S.) or from firms’ annual reports (UK), for 2010-2014. Presented figures were previously converted 
to USD for comparison purposes. 
Furthermore, the non-equity compensation represents a considerable weight of around 20 percent of 
total compensation for both CEO and other top executive directors. Moreover, Table 13 provides an 
additional insight. The overall salary rose by 23.3 percent between 2010 and 2014. The opposite trend 
can be observed with regards to the development of equity awards, which decreased by 65.27 percent. 
Based on existing literature associated with the introduction of FAS 123R and its effect on stock option 
offerings, which was very costly for firms, this can be a plausible explanation for such a decline in the 




Table 13: Executive directors' compensation (2010-2014), split according to CEO and executive managers 
The table shows the split of remuneration plan by CEO and top management position for each respective country. Aligned 
with Table 12, all reported numbers were taken from firms’ proxy statements (US) or from firms’ annual reports (UK), for 
2010-2014 time range. Presented figures were previously converted to USD for comparison purposes. 
On the other hand, CEOs and executive compensation have recorded significant developments during 
the last five years in the UK. The evolution in executive directors’ remuneration has been monotonously 
positive, recording an average growth of 28 percent, with the highest remuneration reached in 2014 of 
$1,903,910.76. While total remuneration more than doubled (by 256 percent) in five years, the 
component salary has decreased significantly by seven percentage points, reducing its weight to 26.81 
percent of the overall package. In addition, the disparity among CEO and remaining executive directors’ 
compensation is fairly the double for the whole observation period. In 2014, the CEO receives a total 
of $2,802,077.20 ($1,616,699.60 above the total remuneration value from other executive directors). 
Moreover, the UK firms proclaim that remuneration plans have been set to reflect the calibre and 
experience of each top executive employee in line with the firm’s policy, while continuously providing 
incentives and rewards for the achievement of long-term targets which support the firm’s strategic 
objectives. Interestingly, across the selected UK firms, a Performance Share Plan (“PSP”) is indicated 
as a dominant component to support aligning individual and collective interests. For any executive 
director rewarded with this component, it is subject to a blend of challenging financial (e.g. adjusted 
EPS) and shareholder return (e.g. total shareholder return, share price) performance conditions tested 
over three years. 20 percent of awards will vest for threshold performance with full vesting only taking 
place when the performance targets are hit or exceeded. Additionally, participants may be entitled to 
any dividends payable on vested shares. 
There are distinct approaches taken between U.S. and UK firms regarding executive compensation. In 
the UK, PSP have become highly popular among digital retailers in order to align incentives and 
promote long-term growth of firms. On the other hand in the U.S., non-equity performance plans are 
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preferred by firms’ remuneration committees. Value retention and pay-for-performance are common 
values across policies with the desired effect of providing appropriate incentives tied to the market price 
of the common stock over a long period of time, which therefore discourages short-term and 
inappropriate decisions by management. 
At last, another particular characteristic of the selected firms is the ratio between fixed and variable 
remuneration. In general, the committee attempts to ensure that remuneration has the right balance 
between fixed and variable pay in order to correctly reward executives based on all effort, commitment 
and results achieved throughout the financial year. As a standard procedures across all observed 
retailers, all pay and incentives of executive directors are reviewed individually on an annual basis in 
order to ensure that performance has been fairly adjudicated and to prevent an excessive reward.  
Overall, N Brown Group has the median ratio fixed-variable with a fixed-variable remuneration of 30-
70 percent. Figure 4 shows the remuneration structure of its two executive directors. 
 
Figure 4: Performance versus Non-performance remuneration, N Brown Group 
The analysis was export from N Brown Group’s annual report (2012-2013), in state the split between performance versus 
non-performance related elements of the compensation scheme. 
 
6.3. Adoption of investment policy and stock awards to top executives 
After generally analysing the main structural changes reported by the firms, the number of equity 
awards to executive directors (including CEOs) are reviewed. This identifies whether such incentives 
were aligned with the company’s investment policy, in order to verify the type of relationship in-
between. With the attempt to obtain better results, only Overstock.com (U.S.) and N Brown Group (UK) 
are chosen. These are the two firms with the highest and most regular stock options offerings in each 
of the respective countries. 
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of equity awards offered by Overstock.com to all its executive directors 
between 2010 and 2014. Apart from an initial decrease during 2010 and 2011, the number of equity 
awards seems to increase continuously in subsequent periods of time. It can be said that throughout the 
observation period, the company has raised investment on capital expenditure. This means that low 
CEO wealth sensitivity leads to a less risky firm policy. To complement this analysis, I perform a second 




Figure 5: CAPEX and equity award offerings (1) 
The chart shows the development of equity awards offerings (red line) and investment in CAPEX (blue line), made by 
Overstock.com, for 2010-2014 time range. A linear trend line for each chart component was added to illustrate the tendency 
described over time. 
As Figure 6 indicates, since 2013 both managerial incentives and investment in CAPEX seem to be 
aligned, showing a positive trend over time. In general, a positive relationship between these two 
variables can be seen, which supports the results obtained in section 5. Based on literature, LTIAs, stock 
options and RUs provide appropriate long-term incentives that reward sustained success through the 
achievement of challenging business targets, thereby consistent with shareholders’ interests. 
Furthermore, equity awards have a positive convexity. Literature argues that an increment in the number 
of equity awards offerings will lead to a higher vega. Although it can be explained by the causal 
relationship between the number of equity awards and capital expenditure in this case, I can confirm 
the positive tendency of both and the commitment to the sustainable targeted results taken by digital 
retailers when regulating LTIAs and risk-taking decisions for capital expenditure purposes. 
 
Figure 6: CAPEX and equity award offerings (2) 
The chart shows the development of equity awards offerings (red line) and investment in CAPEX (blue line), made by N Brown 
Group, for 2010-2014 time range. A linear trend line for each chart component was added to illustrate the tendency described 
over time. 
Concluding, section 6 provides insight of how top executives of digital retailers in U.S. and the UK are 
rewarded by individual and collective performance. The challenge is to fairly remunerate executives in 
order to ensure growth and sustainable results while retaining high-performing workforce of talent and 
unique abilities. Based on best practices, successful digital retailers have chosen to integrate total 
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compensation and total rewards, plus other benefits such as training, development and career 
opportunities into their annual remuneration plan. Additionally, the individual customisation of the 
remuneration package seems to be one of the best ways to promote talent retention in order to keep the 
best people closest to the core business competencies. At last, a regular revision and audit, internal and 
external, is also an appropriate manner to deliver cost-effectiveness of the total executive remuneration 
plan, where the firm stays aligned with its peer group. 
7. Conclusion 
This study uses stock-option based compensation and firm characteristics to analyse the effect of 
managerial incentives on risk-taking policies in the U.S. retailing industry. Literature supports that an 
increase in the executives’ wealth sensitivity to the stock return produces a stimulus for a riskier policy. 
With the attempt to extend this, the paper’s empirical evidence shows a significant, negative, 
relationship between managerial incentives produced by a convex payoff and R&D (contradicting 
literature), for both low tangible retailers and digital retailers. The second finding is obtained from the 
positive and statistically significant (at one percent) relationship between the convexity of the top 
managerial team and CAPEX, for digital retailing firms. A plausible interpretation is that CAPEX is 
treated as a risky investment for already digital retailers, as an investment to further grow the business. 
Overall, one could say that characteristics such as business focus on digital retailing and/or low levels 
of asset tangibility may affect investment decisions due to a change in the sense of riskiness. This can 
be seen for already digitalised retailers where CAPEX is preferred over R&D to incentivise top 
executive for risky investment purposes. 
Considering that this evidence is contradictory to my initial hypotheses, further research was made 
across six similar digital retailers from the U.S. and the UK. Several aspects need to be kept in mind. 
(1) Selected firms from the UK record the highest remuneration levels, plus higher equity offering 
payments through PSP, in contrast to U.S. firms which show higher preferences for bonus schemes as 
motivational incentives for top executive directors. (2) Although managerial incentives are quite distinct 
between U.S. and the UK, all digital retailers are commonly focused on remunerating top executive 
directors according to performance with the objective to achieve upward sustainable results while 
retaining high-performance employees. (3) The provision of a customised compensation scheme to the 
individual combined with cost-effectiveness is common concern across all retailers which is why firms 
audit and regulate this on an annual basis for value-maximization purposes. 
The research around executive compensation and risk-taking across digitalised firms and new 
economies (such as the high-tech sector) has arisen only in recent times and therefore, should require 
further research. Additionally, due to the low explanatory power of some obtained results, the 
robustness of such empirical models in this paper needs to be improved. I believe that the result from 
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future comparisons of share-based compensation across other new types of digital economies will lead 
to a more accurate explanation for the change of riskiness on the investment in CAPEX, which was 
shown in this paper for already digitalised firms. Moreover, the lack of explanatory power on the 
contradictory investment focus between R&D and CAPEX, can lead to further research including other 
investment alternatives, such as M&A and working capital. This could give more tractable and clear 
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Table 14: Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient Test for regression (CAPEX) 
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Table 20: Compensation plan for top executives of selected UK digital retailers (2010 to 2014) 
 
 





Table 22: Definition of variables used in the study (part II) 
